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Abstract: Each period, a player must choose an action without knowing the outcome that
will be chosen by “Nature,” according to an unknown and possibly history-dependent
stochastic rule. We discuss have a class of procedures that assign observations to
categories,  and prescribe a simple randomized variation of  fictitious play within each
category. These procedures are “conditionally consistent,” in the sense of yielding almost
as high a time-average payoff as could be obtained if the player chose knowing the
conditional distributions of actions given categories.  Moreover given any alternative
procedure, there is a conditionally consistent procedure whose performance is no more
than epsilon worse regardless of the discount factor.  Cycles can persist if all players
classify histories in the same way; however in an example, where players classify
histories differently, the system converges to a Nash equilibrium. We also argue that in
the long run the time-average of play should resemble a correlated equilibrium.
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1. Introduction
In this paper we consider the decision problem of a single player who must choose
an action without knowing an outcome chosen either by Nature or by other players.  The
distribution of these outcomes is governed by an “outcome function” that maps histories
(sequences of past actions and outcomes) into current outcomes, but the player does not
know the form that this function takes. Thus the player’s task is to learn the outcome
function through repeated observations.
 We have a designed a class of procedures that are a simple randomized variation
on fictitious play. We show that the player obtains almost as high a time-average payoff
as he could if he divided the sample into categories, and knew in advance both the
frequencies within the categories, and which category the current period's outcome was
going to be drawn from.  We call this property “conditional consistency.”  We show that
this is possible if (i) the categories are chosen with respect to information available at the
time decisions are taken, and (ii) the number of categories used grows sufficiently slowly.
Moreover, given any learning procedures, we can find a procedure of this type that does
no more than epsilon worse regardless of the discount factor; in this sense, there is no
need to look outside this class of procedures.
To focus thoughts, it is useful to consider the game  “matching pennies,” in which
the player announces H or T, the outcome is H or T, and the player’s payoff is 1 if he
guesses correctly, and 0 otherwise.  If the player knew what that period’s outcome was
going to be at the beginning of each period, he could guess correctly all of the time, with2
average payoff of 1.  Obviously there is no procedure that can guarantee that the player
does about this well regardless of the rule that generates the outcomes, since the player’s
minimax payoff is 0.  However, there are procedures that guarantee that the player’s
average payoff is at least as high as if the player knew the asymptotic frequency of
outcome H over the entire infinite horizon, uniformly over all rules for generating
outcomes.   Blackwell [1956] and Hannan [1957] were the first to design learning rules
with this property, which we call “universal consistency.”
We do not have time to present a complete review of the many universally
consistent rules here, but we should stress one important property these rules share: All
universally consistent rules must prescribe randomized play in at least some instances.
(Some intuition for this fact can be gained by considering the minimax theorem, and
noting that “guessing the frequencies” is a kind of zero-sum game. Alternatively, note
that any deterministic procedure can be “defeated” by the outcome function that
“predicts” the action the player is about to play and chooses the action that will minimize
the player’s payoff.) In particular, “classical” fictitious play is not universally consistent.
However, Fudenberg and Levine [1995] show that there are simple “smoothed” or
randomized versions of fictitious play that do satisfy universal consistency.
The starting point for this paper is the fact that universal consistency is a fairly
weak  criterion, since it requires only that the players “get the time averages right,” and
allows them to ignore even simple patterns in the data.   For example, if the outcome in
matching pennies alternates deterministically HTHT... between H and T, universal
consistency only requires the player win half the time, while there are simple universally
consistent rules that can win all the time against this pattern of outcomes.  The weakness3
of universal consistency leads us to develop to the concept of universal conditional
consistency, which is the topic of this paper.  Under this criterion, we divide the player’s
data into subsamples, and ask if the player’s payoff is as high as if he knew the
frequencies of the subsamples and was told each period which subsample that period’s
outcome was going to be drawn from.  For example, we could divide the sample into all
the observations in which the previous outcome had been H, and all those in which the
previous observation had been T (plus the first observation).  In the example of
deterministic alternation, this would mean that the outcome in the first subsample would
always be T, and in the second subsample it would always be H.  Thus, when faced with
this simple deterministic pattern, the only way the player could do as well as he could by
knowing the subsample frequencies in advance would be to win most of the time.
Arbitrary methods of dividing the sample into subsamples do not make sense.  We
focus on classification rules which assign outcomes to categories based only on
information available prior to the observation being made, namely the past history of
actions and outcomes, the action chosen immediately prior to the outcome in question,
and calendar time.  Whether it is in fact possible to be universally conditionally consistent
with respect to such a scheme of dividing the sample depends on the number of categories
into which outcomes can be assigned.  For example, we could assign the outcome in each
time period a different category, in which case universal conditional consistency would be
the same thing as optimization against the actual realized sequence of outcomes, which
we already observed is impossible.
Given a categorization rule, at any moment there is frequency data for certain
categories.  For each such category, we can compute the best response(s)  to the historical4
frequency of opponent’s play in that category, as in the process of fictitious play.  We can
also consider slightly randomized or “smoothed” fictitious play as we did in our [1995]
paper.  We define a conditional smooth fictitious play as a particular randomization
between smoothed fictitious plays corresponding to the different categories for which
observations are available.   Our main results are that these conditional smooth fictitious
plays have two important properties: First, they are universally conditionally consistent.
This shows that they have good asymptotic properties.  But more striking, given any
learning rule, with or without good asymptotic properties, we can find a conditional
smooth fictitious play that does almost as well regardless of the discount factor; that is,
over any short- medium- or long- run, and regardless of the rule generating the
observations.  In other words, we do not have to give up much short-term performance to
assure good asymptotic performance, even in the worst case.
We also discuss the issue of which categorization rules are sensible. Most obvious
examples of categorization rules are finite ones.  For example, if a player suspects that the
outcome may be following a deterministic two-cycle, he can use two categories according
to whether the period is odd or even.   Or, if the player is concerned that the outcome may
be generated by a first-order Markov process, he could use the previous period’s outcome
to define categories. While we have no formal results on “optimal categories, ” we do
have  some  observations to make about category selection.  Most important is the
observation that, if it turns out a player’s own play is a good prediction of the outcome, he
can make use of this information to be “calibrated” in the sense of incorporating any
information implicit in the player’s own intended play.  If a player chooses to use a
calibrated rule, he needed not actually condition on how own play, provided that it  does5
not turn out to be a good prediction of the outcome.  Nevertheless, if all players in a game
use calibrated rules, then the time-average of play must converge to the set of correlated
equilibria.  Since we argue that there is no need to give up asymptotic performance to
achieve short-term goals, this is, in our view, a strong argument in favor of the idea that
the long-run time averages should lie near the set of correlated equilibria.
This paper is closely connected to several lines of research.  Foremost is the
literature on universal consistency, beginning with Blackwell [1956] and Hannan [1957],
and continuing through Banos [1968], Megiddo [1980], Fudenberg and Levine [1995]
and Auer, Cesa-Bianchi, Freund and Schapire [1995].  This work is closely connected to
work in the computer science literature by Vovk [1990], Desantis, Markowski and
Wegman [1992], Feder, Mehrav and Gutman [1992], Kivinen and Warmuth [1993],
Chung [1994], Littlestone and Warmuth [1994] and Freund and Schapire [1996] on
“worst case analysis.”
A second related line is in the papers by Aoyagi [1994] and Sansino [1994]  on
extending the model of fictitious play to allow players to try to detect cycles; we discuss
these papers in  Section 5.
The third related line of research is  the papers on calibrated beliefs by Foster and
Vohra [1993,1994].  They consider the problem of a forecaster who each period must
issue a forecast, that is, a probability distribution over an exogenous set of outcomes such
as the weather.  The forecaster is said to be calibrated if in the asymptotic limit, the
empirical frequencies in periods where each particular probability distribution is forecast
exactly match the forecast probabilities. That is, exact calibration requires that
(asymptotically) it should have rained in exactly 1/3 of the periods in which the forecast6
probability of rain was 1/3, and so on.  Foster and Vohra give an algorithm that ensures
that beliefs are approximately calibrated, based on tracking the historical frequencies for
each (of finitely many) possible probability announcements.
The type of calibration considered by Foster and Vohra is relatively naïve.  Kalai,
Lehrer and Smorodinsky [1996] use Dawid’s [1982] stronger notion of calibration with
respect to checking rules, which can be viewed as a generalization of our conditioning
scheme.   They show that calibration with respect to all checking rules is equivalent to the
merging of opinions, and since the merging of opinions with respect to all models is
impossible, so is calibration with respect to all checking rules.   One interpretation of our
results is that calibration is possible provided that the set of checking rules is sufficiently
small.
Foster and Vohra go on to consider play in games when each player’s behavior
rule is to play a best response to calibrated beliefs.  This guarantees that each action is a
best response to the frequency distribution of outcomes in those periods in which it was
chosen, which is exactly the requirement (in this case) of universal conditional
consistency.  Moreover, as Foster and Vohra show, it assures that in the long run if all
players play this way, the time average of play converges to a correlated equilibrium.
Foster and Vohra’s results provide an argument in favor of the idea that in the
long run the time-average of play should resemble a correlated equilibrium.  The results
here  generalize
3 those of Foster and Vohra,  and provide a stronger argument in several
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respects.  First, the behavior rules we construct are simpler
4, and hence more easily
interpretable and more straightforward to implement.  Moreover, we strengthen their
results by considering the case of discounted payoffs as well as time averaging.  Finally,
we do not require that players actually condition on their own actions, but only that they
are prepared to so if evidence suggests so doing would be beneficial.
2. The Model
Each period t = 12 , ,..., the player chooses an action a from a finite set of actions
A, then observes an outcome  yY Î, a finite set.  The utility from the action a when the
outcome is y is denoted by uay (,) .   The space of probability distributions over a (finite)
set S is denoted by D() S.  Mixed actions are denoted by aÎD() A , and mixed outcomes
by g ÎD() Y.  We will write uu a y a y
ay (,) (,)()()
, a g a g = å  for the expected utility to
mixed actions and outcomes.   It is convenient to define Uu a y ay =max | ( , )| ,  to be the
greatest difference in utility between any action/outcome pair.
A strategy for the player can depend only on the information available to him
when he moves, namely the past values of his own play and the outcome.  A history of
play for the player is denoted by ha y a y tt t = (,, ,, ) 11 K , the space of all histories of play is
denoted by H.  A (behavior) strategy for the player is a map s:( ) HA ®D , while an
outcome function is a map r:( ) HY ®D .  Each strategy-outcome function pair induces a
stochastic process over action/outcome pairs, where given the history ht-1 the conditional
probability of ay tt ,   is s r () [ ] () [ ] hahy tttt -- 11 .  In other words, the player and nature play
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independently, and must base their play only on the history of actions and outcomes.  In
some interpretations, the outcomes may be chosen by other players rather than by nature.
We are also interested in classifying observations into subsamples.  We suppose
that there is given a priori a countable collection of categories Y  into which
observations may be placed.     A classification rule is a map  $: y HA ´® Y .
5   The
interpretation is that prior to observing  yt the player knows ha tt - 1 , , and must choose a
category  $ (, ) y ha tt - 1 based only on this information.
Fix a classification rule  $ y .  Given a history of actions and outcomes ht , we
define nt() y to be the number of times that the category y has been observed, and
P t() y to be the vector whose components are the number of times that each outcome has
occurred in the subsample corresponding to y .  Thus  Pn Y tt () /() () y yÎD  represents
the empirical distribution of outcomes conditional on the category y . For example,
the category might correspond to the previous period’s outcome, so that the distribution
in question is simply the empirical distribution of outcomes  Py ny tt () / ()  conditional on
the previous period’s outcome having been y. 
6 It will also be convenient to define ey ()
to be the unit vector corresponding to the outcome  y .
Notice that although there are countably many categories, for a fixed horizon t
there are only finitely many possible histories.  It follows that there is a minimal finite
subset  $ YY t Î to which all observations taken through time t must belong.  We refer to
                                                
5 For notational simplicity we limit attention to deterministic classification rules.  The use of random
classification rules would lead to notional changes only, provided that Assumption 1 below is satisfied
almost surely.9
this subset as the set of effective categories, and let mt denote the number of effective
categories.  Our basic assumption is that the number of effective categories does not grow
too rapidly.
Assumption 1: lim / tt mt ®¥ = 0.
   We consider two different criteria for the performance of strategies.  First we
consider the time average utility the player receives, compared to how much he can get ex
post if he is restricted to strategies that are measurable with respect to the same
classification rule.  If we define the most utility that is possible against the mixed
outcome g  as Vu a a () m a x (,) g g º , the most utility per period that can be achieved ex
post using a single action in the subsample  y  is
V
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
  
 
Denote the total utility received in the subsample y  by ut() y =  ua (() t
ty Î å .  For each
subsample we define the difference between the utility that might have been and the
utility that actually was as
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We define the total cost to be cc tt t =
Î å () $ y
yY .
Our criterion for successful long run learning relative to the rule  $ y  for choosing
subsamples is that the time average cost ct t /  should be small.
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Definition 1: A strategy s:( ) HA ®D  is e -universally consistent conditional on  $ y if for
every outcome function r , limsup / tt ct ®¥ £e  almost surely with respect to the
stochastic process induced by s r , .
When the classification rule is fixed, we simply refer to a strategy being e -universally
conditionally consistent.
As with universal consistency, universal conditional consistency measures the
rule’s effectiveness in optimizing against an exogenous distribution of opponents’ play.
However, it does not require that players experiment in order to learn how their
opponent’s play varies with their own, nor does it require that the rule do a good job of
influencing their opponents’ play.  Thus the condition seems most natural in settings of
anonymous random matching.  To illustrate this point, consider a repeated Prisoner’s
Dilemma game, with actions “C” (cooperate) and “D” (defect).   Since “D” is a strictly
dominant strategy, it maximizes player 1’s expected payoff in the current period after any
history, so the rule “always play rule D” is universally conditionally consistent with
respect to any categorization scheme. Of course, if player 2’s strategy is Tit-for-Tat, then
player 1’s time average payoff would be much higher if he always played C.
Second, we wish to consider a discounted criterion.  Since strategies may work
well or poorly in the short run depending upon how well the player guesses r , we cannot
hope for a criterion like universal consistency to be satisfied in the first few periods.
However, we can compare two particular strategies.  We will allow time varying discount
                                                                                                                                                
“recent” past.11
factors, so we will say that {} b t is a sequence of discount factors if for each t,bt  is a
strictly positive number, the sequence {} b t is strictly decreasing and  bt t =
=
¥ å 1
1 .
Definition 2: A strategy  $ s  is e -as good as a strategy s  if for all sequences of discount
factors {} b t, all histories h, and al outcome functions r,
bs r bs r e t t tt t t tt uh h uh h
=
¥
-- =
¥
-- åå £+
1 11 1 11 (( ) ,( ) ( $ () , () ).
(Note that this condition is not probabilistic; it must hold over all histories.)
3.  Conditional Smooth Fictitious Play
We begin by introducing a smoothing of the best response function which takes
on interior values (that is, strictly prefers mixed strategies) and is continuous. As noted in
the introduction, all universally consistent rules must prescribe randomized play in at
least some instances. Some intuition for this fact can be gained by considering the
minimax theorem, and noting that “guessing the frequencies” is a kind of zero-sum game.
Alternatively, note that any deterministic procedure can be “defeated” by the outcome
function that “predicts” the action the player is about to play and chooses the action that
will minimize the player’s payoff. In particular, “classical” fictitious play is not
universally consistent.  Further discussion of why randomization is critical to universal
consistency can be found in Fudenberg and Levine [1995]; see Fudenberg and Levine
[1997] for descriptive/behavioral motivations for considering randomized learning rules.
Let vA :int( ( )) D® Â   be any smooth strictly differentiably concave function
satisfying the boundary condition that as g  approaches the boundary of D() A
Dv ®¥.  Define  vv = sup ( ) a a , and suppose that  vU £.  For example, the12
function va a
a () ( /) () l o g() a k a a =- å 1 , discussed more extensively below, satisfies
these properties.  For any such function the function
  Vu v
v () m a x (,) () ga g a a =+ 16
will be smooth and convex and satisfy VV v
v () () gg -£ .  Note the convenient fact that
VU
v £ 2 .  In other words, if v is small, V
v  is a smooth approximation of V.  We also
define aa g a a
v uv =+ argmax ( ( , ) ( )).  This is unique since v is strictly concave, and by
the boundary condition it is interior to the simplex.
There are several useful properties of V
vv , a  which we now summarize.  First,
since v is strictly differentiably concave, the implicit function theorem implies that a
v is
itself smooth.  Moreover, by the envelope theorem  DV u
vv () ( () , ) ga g =× .  This implies
that V
v  is smooth, and since the domain is compact that the second derivative is
bounded.  We can apply Taylor’s theorem to conclude that there is a constant  B
v  such
that
VVD V B
vv v v ( ) () () ( ) ¢-- ¢ -£ ¢ - gg g g g g g
2 .
When there is only a single category, the historical frequencies in that category are
the same as the overall historical frequencies, given by Pn tt -- 11 / .  The procedure of
playing at time t a best response to these frequencies is called fictitious play.  Of greater
interest in the current context is the procedure of smooth fictitious play that is given by
a
v
tt Pn -- 11 / 16 .
It may be useful to consider a specific example.   Suppose as above that
va a
a () ( /) () l o g() a k a a =- å 1 .13
Then
uv u a a
a (,) () (,)(/) () l o g() a g a a g k a a += -å 1 ,
and the first order condition for a maximum is
ua a
v ( , ) ( / )(log $ () ) gk a l -+ - = 11 0 .
where l  is the Lagrange multiplier corresponding to the constraint that the probabilities
a() a must sum to one.  We may easily solve these equations to find
a
k g
kg
v
a
a
ua
ua
()
exp ( ( , )
exp ( ( , )
=
¢ ¢ å
.
Substituting Pn tt -- 11 / , we find
a
k
k
v tt
tt a
a
uaP n
ua P n
()
exp ( ( , / )
exp ( ( , / )
=
¢
--
-- ¢ å
11
11
This is exactly the logistic fictitious play introduced in Fudenberg and Levine [1995].
7  In
the case of a single category, this method of play is e -universally consistent, where
e ® 0 as k ® 0.
8
Because P 0 is null, we are left with flexibility on how design a fictitious play in
the initial period.  The procedure we shall use is to assume that in each category there is
an initial “prior” sample P 0() y, which may contain fractional observations.  The size of
the prior sample is defined as nP y
y 00 () () () y y º å .  While we do not require that the
size of the prior be the same for every category, we do assume that there is a uniform
bound.
Assumption 2: sup ( ) y y Î <¥ Yn 0 .14
We also define the augmented sample, 
~
() () () PPP tt yyy =+ 0, with corresponding
sample size ~() () () nnn tt y y y =+ 0.
In the general case of multiple categories, there is a different smooth fictitious
play
a
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-
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1
1
corresponding to the subsample for each category. If the categorization rule picks a single
category at time t, so that  $ (, ) y ha t - 1  does not depend on a but only on the history ht-1,
then we may define a categorical smooth fictitious play by
s
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In other words, the strategy should be based only on the subsample corresponding to the
category currently selected.  In the case where the category is endogenous, in the sense
that it depends on the action chosen, there is a kind of fixed point problem: the category
determines the probability distribution over actions by a smooth fictitious play, but on the
other hand, the probability distribution over actions determines which category is actually
picked.  We refer to this as the calibrated case.
In the calibrated case, we define categorical smooth fictitious play by solving this
fixed-point problem.  Set 
~~
( $ (, ) ) , ~~ ( $ (, ) ) P P han n ha t
a
tt t
a
tt -- - -- - == 11 1 11 1 yy  to be the cell counts
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and totals corresponding to each different action.  Define the matrix of different smooth
fictitious plays corresponding to different actions (and implicitly, different subsamples)
AP n
P
n
v
tt
v t
a
t
a
aA
(,)
~
~ --
-
- Î
= 
  
  % & K
' K
( ) K
* K
11
1
1
a .
Notice that by assumption on v, the a
v ’s are strictly positive, and hence so is the matrix
A
v .  It follows from the Perron-Frobenius theorem (see, for example, Gantmacher
[1959]) that the equation aa = -- AP n
v
tt (,) 11  has a unique solution. This unique solution is
denoted s
v
t h -1 16 , and is called categorical smooth fictitious play.
We can now state our main results, deferring the proofs to section 6 below.
Proposition 1: The categorical smooth fictitious play s
v  is 2
1 0
v
B
n
v
+
+ Î inf ( ) y y Y
universally conditionally consistent.
Notice that as  v ® 0, we must have the maximum norm of the second derivative of V
v ,
which we denote by  B
v
, converging to infinity.  Consequently, the smaller we take  v ,
the larger we must take the number of prior observations inf ( ) y y ÎY n0 if the
approximation error in the definition of universal conditional consistency is to be
reduced.
Proposition 2: For any pure
9 strategy s and any e  there exists a categorical smooth
fictitious play s
v that is e -as good as s.
                                                
9 The assumption that s is pure simplifies the notation; the theorem can easily be extended to incorporate
mixed strategies as well.16
In other words, s
v  is almost as good as s and is also universally consistent (by
proposition 1).  Note that it is easy to construct a rule that is universally consistent and
does as well as s for a fixed per-period discount factord : simply play s until enough time
has gone by that nothing much matters given the d , then switch to something universally
consistent.  The reason that this result is not trivial is that the definition of “as good”
requires that s
v  yield about as high a present value for any sequence of decreasing
weights on successive time periods. For this reason, the rules that we construct in the
proof of proposition 2 have the property that the amount of time needed to achieve a
given degree of universal consistency is fixed.  Thus, if s is not nearly universally
consistent, there will be discount factors d  sufficiently close to 1 and outcome functions
for which s
v  will substantially outperform s in discounted present value.  In other words,
the uniformly small sacrifice e  provides real insurance against bad outcome functions.
To illustrate proposition 2, consider the particular rule of playing a best response
to the previous period’s outcome and Jordan’s  [1993] three-player matching pennies
game.  In this game, player 1 wins if he plays the same action as player 2, player 2 wins if
he matches player 3, and player 3 wins by not matching player 1.  If all players follow a
fictitious play, play cycles; the same is true for a smooth fictitious play.  However, each
player, in a certain sense, waits too long before switching: for example when player 1
switches from H to T, player 3 does not switch from T to H until player 1 has switched
for a sufficiently long time that the average frequency with which he has played H drops
to  ½.  Smooth fictitious play performs similarly.  However, a player who plays the best-
response rule will switch one period after his opponent does, and as a result will get a17
much higher payoff (in the time average sense, even) than a player using a smooth
fictitious play.
The reason that best response does better is that it guesses correctly both that
opponents’ last period play is a good predictor of this period’s play, and that the
correlation is positive.   If in fact the correlation was negative, so for example the
opponent alternated deterministically between H and T, then best response would do
considerably worse than a smooth fictitious play.  The basic idea of Proposition 2 is that it
is possible (with a small cost) to have the best of both worlds: use a conditional smooth
fictitious play conditioning on the opponents’ play last period, with a strongly held prior
that this period’s play is the same as next period’s play.  In the short run such a rule does
exactly the same thing as best response.  In the long run, if the correlation is actually
positive as it is in the Jordan example, the rule continues to behave like best response.
However, if the correlation is negative, as is the case when the opponent alternates
deterministically between heads and tails, eventually the data overwhelms the prior, and
the conditional smooth fictitious play begins to match the opponents’ moves, beating both
best-response and even ordinary smooth fictitious play.
4. Use of Categorization Rules
So far, we have held fixed the particular categorization rules.  We now examine
the issue of which categorization rules make sense.  Most obvious examples of
categorization rules are finite ones.  For example, if a player suspects that y may be
following a two-cycle, he can use two categories according to whether the period is odd
or even.  He could also use a number of categories corresponding to the number of18
outcomes, and categorize current outcomes according to the outcome in the previous
period.  This type of scheme is considered by Aoyagi [1994] and Sonsino [1995].  This
method has the additional advantage of doing well when the opponents play follows
cycles that are growing in length over time.  This can be the case when both player use
exponential fictitious play: when the same outcome occurs many times in a row,
prediction based solely upon the last period will err only on the infrequent occasions
when there is a switch from one outcome to another.
To understand why particular categorization rules may or may not be useful, we
analyze play between a fixed pair of in a specific example.  As we noted earlier, our
consistency concepts are more compelling with anonymous random matching than in a
setting where the same agents face each other repeatedly, so the following should be
taken  as a possible suggestion of what one might find in richer models, and not as a self-
contained analysis. Consider then the Shapley game, a two player, three action per player
game with payoffs of the form
LM R
Ue e , 0,1 1,0
M 1,0 e e , 0,1
D 0,1 1,0 e e ,
where e > 0. We consider first, as did Shapley, the case where e = 0.  Suppose that both
players use a single category, and given the history in that category they use logistic
fictitious play, for example.  From results of Benaim and Hirsch [1994] we know that19
play can asymptote approximately to any stable best-response cycle.  In this game, such a
cycle begins at L,,M.  Player 1 then wishes to switch to D.  At D,M, player 2 wishes to
switch to L, then from D,L to M,L to M,R to U,Rthen back to the start at U,,M.  It can be
shown that this cycle is asymptotically stable in both the best response and approximate
fictitious play dynamic.  In the case of interest to us, approximate fictitious play, the
cycles are of ever increasing length.  This suggests that players might condition on the
profile from last period.  Suppose that both players do so.  Then it is easy to see that
within each of the nine categories, play is simply an approximate fictitious play, and (if
the initial condition is the right one in each category), play will simply follow the Shapley
cycle within each category.  Of course, players might notice this, and introduce even more
sophisticated conditional cycle detection, but no matter how complicated the
categorization rule they use, as long as they both condition on exactly the same histories,
there will still be a Shapley cycle within each category.
This is reminiscent of Aoyagi’s observation that players who play exact best
responses to their beliefs and asymptotically condition in the same way as each other will
end up following the dynamics of a fictitious play in each category separately.  Intuitively,
the use of a common categorization scheme is much like a public randomization between
initial conditions of the fictitious play.
Why should a player wish to use a calibrated rule?  This is most easily illustrated
in the case e > 0.  In this case we have
Proposition 3: The Shapley game with e > 0 there is a unique correlated equilibrium ; it
is the Nash equilibrium of equal weight on all outcomes.20
Proof:  Consider the first row, and suppose that the equilibrium weights
arer r r LL LM DM ,,.  If these are not all zero, then U must be a best response for player 1
against these weights.  However, D is a strictly better response unless either the weights
are all equal, orr r DM UM > . In a similar way, examining the final column, and making a
similar argument for player 2, we see that either all weights in this row are equal (possibly
to zero) or that r r MR DM > .  Continuing around the Shapley cycle in this way, we see that
we get a contradiction unless all the weights are equal, which corresponds to the unique
Nash equilibrium.
q
On the other hand, while we have not been able to give an algebraic proof that the
Shapley cycle remains locally stable when e > 0, simulations
10 with ordinary and
exponential fictitious play for e <13 /  always give rise to cycles even for initial
conditions that begin near the Nash equilibrium.  A typical Monte Carlo simulation of the
time average of the joint distribution of play is shown below, where e =14 /  and players
use smoothing function of the form va a
a () ( /) () l o g() a k a a =- å 1 , where k = 40 is
shown below.
                                                
10 The simulations were done using Excel 7.0 on a Dell XPS 100c with a bug-free Pentium chip.  The
spreadsheets used for the simulations are available electronically on the World Wide Web at
http://levine.sscnet.ucla.edu/.21
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As can be seen the initial condition is nearly Nash.  The three lines going to zero are the
frequency of the three diagonal outcomes: asymptotically, the diagonal receives
practically no weight.  This is true of all of the simulations.
We conclude from proposition 3 that the cycle does not contain any correlated
equilibria.  It follows from the definition of correlated equilibrium that at each moment of
time that one of the two players has received less utility in time average than he could
have received if he had conditioned on his own action.  However, this player could have
guaranteed a better result by using a calibrated strategy.
It is worth pointing out that if instead of using a calibrated strategy, players
condition on their opponent’s previous action, play in simulations converges to the Nash22
equilibrium.
11  However, as we already argued above, if players  condition on both their
opponent’s and their own previous period play, then we simply get a more complicated
variation of the Shapley cycle. The key is that if the long-run average play is not
converging to a correlated equilibrium, then players will benefit from using a calibrated
rule.
5. Calibrated Play and Correlated Equilibrium
In the previous section we argued that either play converges to a correlated
equilibrium, or players have an incentive to use calibrated rules.  On the other hand, if
players all use universally calibrated rules, the long run average of play must in fact
converge to a correlated equilibrium.
Suppose in fact that players do indeed use calibrated rules in the sense that they
condition on their own anticipated action.  By this we mean that no category can ever be
assigned two observations in which the player’s own action is different. In this case, it is
immediate that the empirical joint distribution of action profiles must come to
approximate a correlated equilibrium, since each player, conditional on his own action, is
playing an approximate best response to the distribution of opponents play.
The resemblance of the empirical joint distribution of action profiles to a
correlated equilibrium is closely related to a point originally made by Foster and Vohra
[1993] who consider best-responses to beliefs that are calibrated.  This means that if we
                                                
11 Aoyagi [1994] also considers an example where two players classify observations using different
categories.  However, in his example players are using exact fictitious play within categories so the player
with a more refined category scheme can exploit the player with the less refined scheme.  This cannot
happen with exponential fictitious play.23
categorize periods according to forecasts of opponents’ play, the frequency distribution of
actual opponents’ play converges to the forecast.  This implies that actions are calibrated
in the sense that each player conditional on his own action, is playing an approximate best
response to the distribution of opponents play, the condition that leads directly to
correlated equilibrium.
However, even the use of calibrated rules leaves open the possibility that
opponents “accidentally” correlate their play.  If they did not do so, then we would have
the stronger result that play would eventually come to resemble a Nash equilibrium.
What we should point out is that calibration guarantees no such thing.  The easiest way to
make this point is to observe that calibration of actions does not actually require that
players condition on their own actions; it is sufficient that they condition on their own
pairs of actions.  By this we mean that no category can ever be assigned two periods with
more than two distinct values of the players own action. The essential point is that if a
joint distribution over two actions and all outcomes has the property that the realized
utility is at least that that can be obtained by playing a single best-response to the
marginal distribution over outcomes, then each action must actually be a best response
conditional on that action.
12  In particular, if each player has only two actions, then his
strategy is calibrated even if he uses only a single category, for example, exponential
fictitious play is calibrated in this case.
                                                
12 More generally, it follows from straightforward algebra that if  a joint distribution over all actions and all
outcomes has the property that the realized utility is at least that that can be obtained by playing a best
response to the marginal distribution over outcomes, then no action is a worst response to the distribution of
outcomes conditional on that action.24
Consider once again the three player, two action per player game of matching
pennies introduced by Jordan [1993].  In this game player 1 wishes to match player 2,
who wishes to match player 3, who wishes to avoid matching player 1.  Again we can
apply the results of Benaim and Hirsch [1994], and, supposing that player use exponential
fictitious play,
13 focus on best-response cycles.  The key is that in every pure strategy
profile exactly one player can gain by deviating.   Once he does so, one opponent wishes
to switch, and so on in a cyclic fashion.  Jordan also shows that this cycle is
asymptotically stable under exact fictitious play; Benaim and Hirsch extend this to
stochastic smoothed versions.  Moreover, since each player has only two actions, it
follows that this cycle takes place (approximately) through the set of correlated equilibria.
Despite the fact that players are calibrated and play resembles a correlated equilibrium,
this cycle is just as disturbing as the Shapley cycle: players observe long sequences of
their opponent repeatedly playing the same action, yet fail to anticipate it will happen
again.  If they (all) introduce schemes conditioning on last period’s play, then the cycle
simply takes place independently in each category and so forth and so on.  Consequently
the issue in cycling is not calibration per se, but rather, whether or not players use
categorization rules in lock step.
Finally, we should observe that the long-run behavior of the exponential fictitious
play is quite different from that of calibrated play: in the Shapley example with
01 3 << e / calibrated play converges globally to the unique correlated equilibrium
                                                
13 Implicitly we assume that when there are more than two players, the profile of opponents’ actions is
treated as a single outcome.  This means that each player tracks a joint distribution of opponents’ play.
Jordan actually supposes that players do fictitious play in his example by keeping a separate distribution for25
(which places weight 1/9, 1/9, 1/9 on the diagonal).  In contrast, exponential fictitious
play does not converge, and asymptotically places almost no weight on the diagonal.
6.  A Bound for Universal Conditional Consistency
We turn now to proving the two main results.  It is convenient to begin by
imagining that, in a sense to be made precise, the player gets to play against his prior as
well as the actual sample.  More precisely, each category has a prior utility
un u P n P n
v
0 0 0000 () () ( (() / () ) ,() / () ) yy a y y y y =
corresponding to the utility that would have been received had the player played a
“smoothed best-response” to repeated observation of the prior sample.  We can also
define a utility with prior for the entire course of play ~() () () uuu tt y y y º+ 0 that includes
the prior utility.  If we compute the cost using not only the prior utility, but also replacing
the utility that could have been achieved V  with the smooth version V
v , we get the
smooth cost with prior
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The basic idea in what follows is that V
v  is very close to V , and in a large
sample, the prior does not matter very much, so it is sufficient to study the smooth cost
with prior.  Indeed, define the incremental (smooth) cost (with prior)
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each opponent, and assuming their play is independent.  However, in this particular game, there is no
distinction between the two procedures, since each player cares only about the play of one opponent.26
Our two propositions follow from a lemma that gives a basic bound on the incremental
cost.
Lemma 1: (a)  |~ (,) | ga y U t
v £ 4
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Remark 1:  Note that the bound (b) is by far the most significant; the bound (a) simply
says that  ~ gt
v  is a bounded random variable, which makes it easy to use the strong law of
large number.  The bound (b) is what enables us to reach conclusions about universal
consistency.
Remark 2: Since  ~ (( ) ,) / ( i n f () ) gh v B n t
v
t
v sg y y -Î £+ + 10 1 Y , then the same bound must
also be satisfied by the maxmin strategy for the zero-sum game -~ (,) ga y t
v .  If  $ s
v  is such
a strategy, we refer to it as a myopic play.   It follows that Lemma 1 (and Proposition 1)
remain true if the strategy of smooth categorical fictitious play is replaced with myopic
play.
Proof of Lemma 1:
We begin by writing out  ~ gt
v .  Let y t
a  =  $ (, ) y ha t - 1  be the category at time t chosen
by the classification function if a is played then.  Abbreviate ~~ () nn t
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-- = 11 y  and
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() PP t
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a
-- = 11 y .  With this notation, (a) follows from the following calculation27
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Moreover, since V
v is smooth we may apply Taylor’s theorem as discussed above to
conclude
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We may rewrite this in terms of the matrix  AP n
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proof of Proposition 1:  Observe first that
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By Lemma 1(a)  ~ g
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since the difference in the objective functions is going to zero.  So we conclude
limsup ~ / TT T ccT ®¥ -= 0  giving the desired result.
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Turning to Proposition 2, we observe that it follows from the following Lemma
dealing with the non-history contingent case.
Lemma 2: For any strategy s  of playing a constant action a  and any e  there exists a
smooth fictitious play s
v that is e -as good as s .
Before proving the Lemma, we discuss how it can be used to prove Proposition 2.
The rule that is being outperformed in Lemma 2, that of guessing the opponent will
always play a single action, is not a terribly interesting rule.  However, let s be an
arbitrary deterministic learning rule,
15 and let e > 0 be given.   Take a set of  Y = A to be
                                                                                                                                                
14 Recall that a sequence of r.v.’s  yt  is orthogonal if Ey y t k tk =¹ 0, .
15 The extension to random rules is straightforward.30
set of actions. Define the classification rule  $ () () y hs h tt = , that is, classify histories
according to the way in which s is going to play.  For each a choose a smooth fictitious
play s e (,) aso that Lemma 2 is satisfied with respect to e , and define a rule
$(,) ( ) (,$ () ) (( $ )) s e s e y y sh h h tt t =
by applying the appropriate smooth fictitious play to the sub-history of the chosen
category. Lemma 2 immediately implies that  $ s  is the rule that gives Proposition 2.  Note
that the fact that Lemma 2 holds for arbitrary non-stationary discount sequences is
important, since even if we use stationary discounting in Proposition 2, when we look at
sub-histories to apply Lemma 2, the discount factor will no longer be stationary, since the
sequence of sub-histories involves skipping periods during which a particular category
was not used.
Proof of Lemma 2: We may assume without loss of generality that a  is a best-response
to an open subset of opponent correlated strategies, since if not, a  is weakly dominated
by a strategy that does satisfy this property, and we may simply replace a  with this
dominating strategy in the calculations below.  Consequently, there exists a prior such
that a  is a best response to  Pn 00 / .   From Lemma 1(b)
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Adding up over periods, we have
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and since a  is by assumption a best response to  Pn 00 / , it must also be that
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Applying this inequality give
uhu h h T v
TB
tn
t
v
tt t
T
v
( , () )( () , () ) ar s r -- - = -£ +
+ å 11 1 1
0
2 .
Finally, choosing vn , 0 appropriately, we get
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for all T.
Making use of the fact that average present value may be written as a convex
combination of time averages over shorter time intervals we immediately can convert this
into a result for discounting;32
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7. Conclusion
Given any particular learning rule we have shown how to construct a rule that
does almost as well regardless of the discount factor and does as well asymptotically as if
the conditional probabilities of a sufficiently small number of events was known in
advance.  This is true regardless of the process generating the outcomes. These rules have
the interpretation of being a convex combination of smooth fictitious plays corresponding
to the different available categories.  If strategies that successfully condition on the most
recently chosen actions are used by all players, then in the long the time average of the
frequency of strategy profiles must remain near the set of correlated equilibria.
Moreover,  it is not essential that players actually condition on their own most recently
chosen action, it is enough that they have the option of doing so, and use a categorization
procedure with the property that if has been historically advantageous to condition on
own past action, then this type of categorization will be introduced.  This suggests that in
the long run the play of sophisticated players should resemble a correlated equilibrium.
The convergence-to-correlated- equilibrium s result cannot in general be
strengthened to eliminate cycles or give convergence to a Nash equilibrium, no matter
how sophisticated the learning procedure employed by players are, since they might
“accidentally” coordinate their learning procedures.  In an example, noise, in the form of
lack of coordination between players’ learning procedures, does lead to a Nash33
equilibrium.  Whether this type of noise, or noise from a large population of players
playing independently, might generally lead to Nash equilibrium remains an open
question.34
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